Anonymous 
- China’s continued investment in the port, despite its lacklustre performance, has raised suspicions that it is intended for use as a Chinese navy base
- However, despite its strategic location, the port is not as attractive as the ones in Karachi and Ormara, nor does Islamabad seem interested in a permanent Chinese naval presence
On August 14, a roadside bomb targeted a convoy carrying Chinese engineers in Gwadar, Pakistan. While none were injured, the continued presence of Chinese workers in Gwadar, despite recurring terrorist attacks, might puzzle casual observers.
By accepting Pakistan’s 40-year lease proposal for the Gwadar port’s construction and operation in 2013, Beijing also signed up to the inherent risks of working in Balochistan, a province marred by insurgency. The choice underscored a prioritisation of strategic interests over purely economic ones.
Despite Gwadar Port operating since 2008, it has seen minimal economic activity. While trade activity at Karachi Port and Port Qasim averaged 41 and 48 million tonnes respectively between 2020 and 2023, Gwadar Port reported under 100,000 tonnes.
This disparity, combined with persistent Chinese investment despite obvious risks, has bolstered the idea that Beijing may be helping Pakistan construct a larger naval facility at Gwadar for potential access and use by the Chinese navy.
On August 14, a roadside bomb targeted a convoy carrying Chinese engineers in Gwadar, Pakistan. While none were injured, the continued presence of Chinese workers in Gwadar, despite recurring terrorist attacks, might puzzle casual observers.
By accepting Pakistan’s 40-year lease proposal for the Gwadar port’s construction and operation in 2013, Beijing also signed up to the inherent risks of working in Balochistan, a province marred by insurgency. The choice underscored a prioritisation of strategic interests over purely economic ones.
Despite Gwadar Port operating since 2008, it has seen minimal economic activity. While trade activity at Karachi Port and Port Qasim averaged 41 and 48 million tonnes respectively between 2020 and 2023, Gwadar Port reported under 100,000 tonnes.
This disparity, combined with persistent Chinese investment despite obvious risks, has bolstered the idea that Beijing may be helping Pakistan construct a larger naval facility at Gwadar for potential access and use by the Chinese navy.
In the early 2000s, Pakistan began reaching out to China to help build a naval base at Gwadar. By 2005, Pakistan’s naval chief had envisioned it as the nation’s third naval base, complementing the Karachi base and the Jinnah base at Ormara.
Gwadar is seen as a probable location for a Chinese naval base due to its strategic position near the Strait of Hormuz and ability to host large warships. It is anticipated that Chinese navy warships will dock at Gwadar for repairs and replenishment, as they have in Karachi in the past. This would address China’s ability to sustain a fleet in the Indian Ocean and may allow Beijing access to regional maritime data.
However, to what extent will this potential be realised? Key considerations include the nature of China’s intelligence operations concerning US naval activities and whether Pakistan would allow the Chinese navy permanent access to its bases.
Intelligence gathering by Chinese entities or navy personnel at such facilities is hardly new. US Navy Lieutenant Commander Joseph McGinnis’ research highlighted the Karachi and Jinnah naval bases as primary choices for the Chinese navy due to their “superior repair, logistics, and military facilities”. If China were to use Pakistan-based facilities for overseas operations, these two bases would be prioritised.
Besides, Pakistan hosts most of its naval assets – much of them Chinese-supplied – at the Karachi and Jinnah bases. Chinese technicians have been present at the former for years and are likely to be at the latter too, given the relocation of strategic assets there since 2011.
Beijing would probably have been gathering intel on US naval activities in the Persian Gulf through its assets and personnel at these bases. If the US had reservations, it would have exercised its leverage over Pakistan to address them.
Additionally, such surveillance is hardly unique. Chinese firms operating ports in over 50 countries similarly monitor naval operations, according to Isaac B. Kardon and Wendy Leutert in their 2022 International Security article, “Pier competitor: China’s power position in global ports”.
Pakistan is likely to accept this trade-off in return for Chinese naval transfers, given the constraints on obtaining military equipment from the US and Europe. Islamabad aims to increase its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities not only against India but against terrorists, who have previously targeted Pakistan’s naval strategic assets.
The Pakistani cabinet’s recent nod towards renewing the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement with the US after its 2020 expiration indicates Islamabad’s interest in US military tech integrated with ISR features. If China offers similar tech, it might understandably want access for regional data collection.
Yet, this is vastly different from the Chinese navy deploying surveillance ships directly on the Pakistani coast. Currently, the Chinese navy primarily utilises its Djibouti base for noncombat and anti-piracy missions near the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, up to North Africa. Having a foothold in Pakistan’s southwestern shores would significantly aid operations extending to the Persian Gulf.
Islamabad has previously allowed port calls by the Chinese navy, including submarine visits. Pakistan’s chief of naval staff recently indicated an openness to more such visits, including from Chinese aircraft carriers.
Still, the primary role of the temporary deployment of Chinese navy personnel and warships on these bases has been to offer training to Pakistani navy officers and improve interoperability on Pakistan’s warships of Chinese origin. To date, the Chinese navy hasn’t established a consistent naval presence on Pakistani bases.
Pakistan would be wise to avoid granting the Chinese navy access to its bases for contingency operations, as this could one day translate into regional military actions or coercive diplomacy.
Instead, Islamabad seems to be leveraging the possibility of such port calls to secure support from the US. For example, the US has approved a US$450 million F-16 sustainment sale and supported an International Monetary Fund loan package.
There are two scenarios in which Pakistan might allow permanent Chinese navy deployments at its bases.
One, Washington’s support for Islamabad diminishes and punitive actions against Pakistan increase, coupled with amplified backing for India’s defence capabilities and potential military campaigns against Pakistan. In other words, unless Pakistan anticipates an irreversible breakdown in its strategic relationship with the US, it would be reluctant to permit a permanent Chinese naval presence.
Two, if China supersedes the US in economic, military and diplomatic dominance, and Pakistan secures guarantees from Beijing, then Pakistan’s expectation of US benefits or penalties may diminish, enabling more latitude in its decisions.
Riaz Khokhar is a research analyst on geopolitics and security of the Indo-Pacific region and a former Asia studies visiting fellow at East-West Center in Washington
Attacks on Chinese targets in Pakistan ‘unlikely to derail close economic ties’
- In the latest incident, a convoy of Chinese workers was attacked on the way to Gwadar Port in Balochistan and two attackers died in a shoot-out
- Both countries have been working to improve security following a string of deadly attacks carried out by the Balochistan Liberation Army
Attacks on Chinese workers in Pakistan are not expected to have a major impact on the economic cooperation between the two countries, analysts said following the latest attack.
A convoy of 23 Chinese engineers in four bulletproof vehicles was attacked by insurgents on their way to the Gwadar Port in Balochistan on Sunday, the Chinese consulate in Karachi said.
The Balochistan Liberation Army, a separatist insurgent group, later claimed responsibility.
“Attacks like this, along with other security incidents, will have a certain impact on the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, especially for individual investors … [when it comes to] risk assessment,” said Zhu Yongbiao, professor at Lanzhou University’s school of politics and international relations.
But he said the impact would be limited as both China and Pakistan had taken such security threats into account in the beginning and protection for Chinese workers had improved in the past two years following a series of deadly attacks.
“[These protection efforts] include sending troops to protect Chinese personnel, facilities, enterprises … and detecting a considerable number of attempted terrorist attacks in advance,” he said.
According to the Pakistani armed forces, two attackers were killed by security forces escorting the Chinese convoy during the exchange of fire.
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